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Abstract 
The special nature of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and tracheostomy with invasive 
ventilation (TIV) lead to challenges that can be difficult in two senses: not only to handle 
well, but also to discuss with patients and other involved stakeholders. Because of the delicate 
nature of interpersonal relations and communication in ALS, some of the downsides to TIV 
may almost take on a nature of taboo, making them difficult to raise for open discussion. Yet 
these ethical challenges are important to be aware of, not only for health professionals and 
managers but, arguably, also for patients and next of kin. They are important also for a wider 
professional and societal debate about whether and to whom TIV should be offered. In this 
paper we highlight and examine ethical challenges in TIV for ALS, with a special emphasis 
on those that are hard to discuss openly and that therefore might fail to be addressed. The 
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analysis is structured by the four core principles of healthcare ethics: beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, respect for patient autonomy, and justice. 
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Today most untreated ALS patients die from respiratory failure within three years of 
diagnosis [1]. Non-invasive ventilation (NIV) relieves symptoms and prolongs life, especially 
in patients with non-bulbar ALS [2-5]. However, in most cases non-invasive ventilation will 
eventually become difficult to tolerate or manage as bulbar function deteriorates. Weakness in 
the face or upper airway muscles may in some cases make it impossible to introduce NIV in 
the first place [6]. For these patients, invasive mechanical ventilation with tracheostomy 
(TIV) is the only alternative to death when respiratory failure is manifest.    
 
The use of TIV in ALS patients is challenging because it allows the patient to survive with 
increasing pareses, which will render him or her totally dependent on help from others and 
ultimately may lead to a locked-in state with the inability to communicate. Whereas the 
ventilator is itself rather inexpensive, the economic, social and emotional burdens of 24/7 care 
are challenging both to formal and informal caregivers [7]. The use of TIV in ALS varies 
ranging from 0% of patients from the UK, 1-14% in the USA, 3% in Germany, 2-5% in 
France, 11% in northern Italy, to 27-45% in Japan, likely reflecting cultural, economic, legal 
and organisational differences both within and outside the healthcare system [8, 9]. In 
Norway and Sweden, 6.7% of men and 3.8% of women living with ALS between 2002 and 




The use of TIV in ALS patients thus raises several ethical issues. Alongside the benefits of 
treatment may come negative consequences for both patient, next of kin, health professionals, 
healthcare systems and society. Because of disease-specific factors, but most of all because of 
the prospect of death and the delicate nature of interpersonal relations and communication in 
ALS, some of the downsides to TIV may almost take on a nature of taboo, making them 
difficult to raise for open discussion among the different stakeholders. Yet, these ethical 
challenges are important to be aware of, for health professionals, managers and, arguably, 
also for patients and next of kin. They are important also for a wider professional and societal 
debate about whether and to whom TIV should be offered. 
 
The aim of this paper is to bring to light and examine ethical challenges with TIV in patients 
with ALS, with a special emphasis on what we perceive as the most difficult challenges. Our 
analysis draws on clinical experience from Norway, in addition to published research. 
Societal contexts and medical cultures differ. In the Scandinavian countries, patients do not 
have an unqualified right to TIV; the responsible physician has the formal decision-making 
authority. Although some of the arguments we make might take on a different character or be 
accorded less weight in other medical cultures, most of the arguments are likely to be of some 
relevance also in medical cultures that differ from the Scandinavian. Of note, our analysis 
under the heading ‘justice’ pertains specifically to the context of publicly funded healthcare 
systems such as those of many European countries. The analysis is structured by the four core 






A basic question to ask about TIV for ALS is whether and to what extent it is a beneficial 
intervention. ALS is a progressive, incurable, fatal disease. The prognosis depends on the 
individual disease course, but nutritional and respiratory status will influence life-expectancy. 
The main goal of treatment is to minimise morbidity and maximise quality of life (QoL) 
although some patients might perceive maximising life expectancy as a goal in itself. 
 
How much TIV actually prolongs life appears to vary hugely between countries, reflecting 
both differing medical practices, legislation, social/religious and cultural issues as well as 
provision and organisation of caregiving and financial considerations. Median survival in 
uncontrolled groups varies from 8 to 89 months in the literature [11-14]. Age <65 years, 
marital status, previous NIV, the option to receive care in the home and rapid deterioration of 
respiratory function may promote a choice of TIV. Some patients become dissatisfied over 
time; the most common reason for patient requests for the withdrawal of TIV in end-stage 
ALS is loss of meaning of life [15]. Before commencing treatment, it can be difficult to 
predict how treatment and QoL will be perceived by the particular patient. This must be 
communicated to the patient prior to deciding to start TIV. 
 
Several studies have shown that QoL is maintained with disease progression and is not 
dependent on physical function, but rather relies more upon psychological and existential 
factors [16-19]. In general, assessing the quality of life of another person requires caution. In 
patients with severe diseases, such as ALS, both healthcare professionals, caregivers and 
healthy individuals seem to underestimate not only QoL, but also other patient-perceived 
metrics [20-23]. To many, the plight of the ALS sufferer, experiencing relentless gradual loss 
of function with a total locked-in syndrome (TLS) as the potential end state, appears to be one 
of the worst fates imaginable. Yet it has been demonstrated that patients who suffer a 
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dramatic loss of function often undergo a reorientation, coming to terms more or less with 
their new situation of disability [24, 25].  
 
However, interpretation of reported patient satisfaction with the choice of life-supportive 
treatment is by nature difficult, when death is the only alternative to the intervention. Perhaps 
controversially, based on clinical experience we claim that subtle psychological mechanisms 
might come into play when the patient is asked to report their satisfaction. For instance, 
acknowledging one’s ambivalence or outright regret in having chosen TIV can be hard: the 
patient will then have to live not only with the consequences of a regrettable choice, but also 
with guilt or other negative emotions that come from having placed oneself and one’s loved 
ones in a difficult situation. In our view, decision-making cannot be based solely upon 
reported satisfaction [26].  
 
Nonmaleficence 
A negative consequence of initiating TIV is that death may then only ensue either from an 
explicit choice, or from an unrelated fatal illness or accident [27]. When adequate nutrition 
and comprehensive, competent caregiving is provided the ventilator may prolong life 
considerably. There might then no longer be an opportunity to elect to ‘let nature take its 
course’, dying solely from the disease itself, and not also in some measure from the decision 
to withdraw treatment, be it the patient’s or the physician’s. The disease is an ultimate cause 
of death, but the decision to discontinue TIV is also (in some sense) a cause of death. This 
situation can place an additional burden on the patient as well as the surroundings. 
 
Patients considering TIV must be informed of the right to have the treatment withdrawn, and 
also that expressing a wish for treatment withdrawal may become increasingly difficult 
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throughout the disease course. Problems are most likely to arise where there has been no prior 
discussion and agreement on criteria for when TIV should be withdrawn, or when it is unclear 
whether the patient later on has changed his or her mind. It is therefore essential to carefully 
discuss and decide on such criteria together with the patient prior to commencing TIV. 
However, a prior agreement on withdrawal criteria does not solve every problem with the 
proper timing of withdrawal. Particularly if these are based on poorly defined criteria for 
motor function such as entering the locked-in state (TLS), there is a substantial risk of harm 
that stems from the problem of getting the timing of the discontinuation of TIV right. In 
general, if TIV is halted too soon, then the patient loses valuable time; if too late, then the 
patient is burdened with a prolonged dying process and time wherein the burdens of treatment 
and of the condition are not made up for by the benefit of living. The timing is demanding 
because deterioration is gradual and there might be no natural and readily identifiable stage 
where TIV ought to be discontinued. Communication with the patient about preferences at 
this stage might be exceedingly hard; first, because of difficulties from the advanced paralysis 
in the end-stage of disease; second, because of previously unrecognised and developing 
cognitive/executive dysfunction that occur in a substantial proportion of patients, and that 
might be difficult to assess. For instance, although in theory the cessation of the ability to 
communicate through eye movements is a clear demarcation line, in practice there might be a 
phase in which the patient’s communication is variable and/or reduced, and clinicians become 
unsure of whether the relevant threshold has been reached. If the clinician is to be on the safe 
side – ‘erring on the side of life’ – one risks overtreatment in a phase in which quality of life 
is poor. This would constitute a substantial harm.  
 
In our view, when the timing is right the discontinuation of TIV is medically and ethically 
proper. The intention is to spare the patient of continued treatment which has been found to 
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no longer be of benefit, and the intention is thus morally upright. Laws, mores and cultural 
traditions that obstruct withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment when continued treatment is 
not in the patient’s interest contribute to overtreatment, leading to both patient harm and 
waste of healthcare resources. 
 
In medical ethics, the principle of nonmaleficence pertains to risks, harms and other negative 
consequences of healthcare for the patient. However, because TIV in ALS affects not only the 
patient but certainly also the next of kin and the professional caregivers, it is highly relevant 
to discuss negative consequences of treatment also for these other stakeholders [28]. Indeed, 
TIV is an invasive treatment in more than one sense of the word. Particularly when provided 
in the patient’s home, TIV transforms many aspects of the family’s daily life. For the next of 
kin there are not only benefits but also potentially very significant burdens. Arguably, 
therefore, the traditional paradigm wherein the views of the next of kin are of little 
significance when the patient remains formally competent is challenged by the case of TIV 
for ALS.  
 
The obvious benefit for the next of kin is that their loved one remains alive for extra months 
or years. The burdens, however, are subtler and might be particularly challenging to talk 
about in an open manner. Although TIV extends life it also postpones death; the patient 
remains alive in a severely disabled state, which prevents the next of kin from grieving and 
moving on with their lives. In some situations, this might be of particular significance for any 
underage children. What does it do to them to have their parent ‘locked’ into such a state 
with, in particular, reduced means of communication for an indefinite time? For a spouse, 
divorce or separation might be perceived as cruel and morally impossible, thus leaving no 
choice but to support the patient in the decision to choose and to continue TIV. In a German 
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study the QoL of ALS patients on NIV and TIV was compared to that of their caregivers, 
mainly spouses. The study showed a good overall QoL for both NIV and TIV patients, but a 
very high burden of care for TIV caregivers, 30% of whom rated their own QoL lower than 
that of the patient. Sexuality was an important issue. The authors conclude that in the 
assessment of QoL in a home palliative care situation the primary caregivers should always be 
included [29]. 
 
Knowing that a proportion of ALS patients experience early cognitive decline, there is also 
the somewhat disturbing – but nonetheless important – question of to what degree the patient 
is able to empathise with the plight of the next of kin. How does the patient take the interests 
of the next of kin into account when deciding for or against the commencement or 
continuation of TIV? In our view, inability or unwillingness of the patient to reflect upon the 
likely negative impact of caregivers’ QoL should be taken into consideration when deciding 
for or against offering TIV. At the very least, the burden on spouse and children should be a 
compulsory part of the information given before the choice of TIV is taken. Irrespective of 
this there is another subtle moral problem: The patient might, by their very existence, burden 
their loved ones, and be aware of being a burden. Is it reasonable to expect the patient to take 
into account the burdens to their next of kin when deciding for or against TIV, when their 
own life is at stake? 
 
The very discussion of whether TIV should be commenced can put the next of kin in an 
awkward situation. Despite the clear intention of physicians that next of kin should neither 
encourage or discourage, but support the patient in decision-making, next of kin may feel 
obliged to promote the prolongation of life. In a sense, how can they do anything but 
encourage the patient to choose TIV? Anything less could risk implying that the patient’s 
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death would come as a welcome relief. Health professionals should be aware of such 
complicated interpersonal dynamics that are put into play when TIV is up for discussion. 
 
Providing care for TIV patients in their own home represents great challenges for the 
healthcare professionals (HCPs) involved. Many HCPs find their status as mere guests in the 
patients’ homes as difficult. Their decisions might be challenged by family members who 
have become experts on the patient’s care, and it might be impossible to satisfy the 
expectations of both administrators, patient and family members. Such challenges can lead to 
professional dissatisfaction, moral distress and burnout, and high turnover rates, leading to 
lack of continuity and competence among HCPs [30]. 
 
Respect for patient autonomy 
Respect for the patient’s right to accept or refuse medical interventions are mainstays of 
modern healthcare. Prerequisites, however, are competence and being informed. Whether 
these requirements are in place might sometimes be questioned in cases of TIV for ALS. 
Cognitive and behavioural impairment is highly relevant to patient autonomy and decision-
making. ALS-specific changes may be subtle, or they may be overt, such as in frontotemporal 
dementia (FTD). The overlap between ALS and FTD is well established on a 
neuropathological, genetic and clinical level. In recent publications, estimates of up to one 
half of the patient population demonstrates heterogeneous changes in cognition or behaviour, 
15% meeting the criteria for FTD [31]. The need to assess routinely for such manifestations, 
both prior to critical decisions and possibly during the course of the treatment, is comparable 
to assessing the degree of competence, a defining feature of patient autonomy. Ultimately, 
such assessments may be crucial to achieve real empowerment and genuinely shared decision-
making. Recent studies suggest that the development of cognitive impairment follows a rather 
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specific pattern as the disease process spreads across the brain [32]. Thus, the level of 
cognitive impairment and autonomy may change throughout the disease process, and 
evaluations performed before initiation of TIV may not be relevant later on. 
 
The diverse aspects of cognitive impairment and behavioural abnormalities that may be seen 
in ALS patients include the following: Loss of executive functions, loss of ability to change 
focus, inexplicable deviations from previously stated opinions, loss of insight, loss of 
empathy, in addition to problems with speech and thinking that compound communication 
problems due to dysarthria. These are among the very skills that a patient needs to wield their 
autonomy and to display decision-making competence. How does one resolve issues of 
autonomy and competence in a patient that is so dramatically bereft of the tools of autonomy, 
and might lack the communication skills to prove their competence?   
 
If an ALS patient becomes fully dependent on the assistance of their family in order to realise 
the slightest acts of autonomy – is the patient then really autonomous? What degree of insight 
and empathy might one expect from a patient in such a situation? The kind of symbiosis that 
develops between ALS patients and their closest caregivers challenges the traditional view on 
patient autonomy. Even though this peculiar state that ALS patients and their caregivers 
frequently reach is well-known to HCPs caring for ALS patients, it is quite different from 
most experiences we usually have as human beings, and as patients with less incapacitating 
disorders. Is it possible for a patient who is not yet there, to truly envision such a state? How 
does the cognitive impairment seen in ALS impact on the ability to perform such thought 
experiments? And even if the patient is able, is it reasonable to demand that they undertake 
the weighing of their own interests – which include the ability to go on living – against the 
burden placed on their loved ones? What does an informed choice imply in such a situation – 
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what should the patient be required to take into consideration before the choice is sufficiently 
informed? 
 
In our experience, most ALS patients are relieved when given the chance to talk with health 
professionals about the terminal stages of their disease. Nevertheless, some patients seem 
uncomfortable discussing whether to seek TIV as the disease progresses. Apparently, these 
patients prefer not to think about the subject, and are reluctant to make active choices about 
their own death. They may however feel pressured into doing so because the health 
professionals need to clarify what to do when respiratory failure ensues. In this way, the very 
availability of TIV places a burden on some patients: Their right to withdraw from 
psychologically challenging (perhaps even damaging) discussions and choices about TIV, the 
end stages of the disease and death, may then be denied them [33]. 
 
Justice 
Fair priority setting in healthcare has become a virtue of necessity even in affluent countries. 
In general, resources spent on treatment A for patient group X could instead have been spent 
on treatment B for patient group Y. Both clinicians and politicians are sometimes reluctant to 
perform overt rationing, especially when identifiable patients are thereby denied beneficial 
services [34]. Yet certain healthcare services are exceedingly resource intensive and/or 
provide relatively meagre benefits. Clinicians and other decision-makers need to increase 
their awareness of such issues if priority setting is to be performed in a way that promotes 
equitable distribution of scarce resources.  
  
In this context, TIV for ALS is a very resource intensive service. Few studies examine the 
cost of home mechanical ventilation. In a recent Canadian study, however, the overall median 
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monthly healthcare cost with invasive ventilation was €6,200 across all diagnoses with the 
highest cost in ALS (range: €6,031-12,471) [35]. In a Norwegian, context the presence of 
professional carers in the patient’s home around the clock would incur yearly costs in excess 
of €500,000, which would be covered by public funds. Even when the varying costs between 
countries are taken into account, the cost-per-QALY (quality-adjusted life year) for TIV for 
ALS appears to be very high, implying a low cost-effectiveness compared to most other 
healthcare services. Advocates for fair priority setting in healthcare by way of cost-
effectiveness calculations typically maintain that a condition for fairness is that services are 
treated similarly across specialties and sectors. Thus, the principle of equality might appear to 
entail that TIV for ALS is too expensive for the benefit it confers, and thus ought not to be 
offered within public healthcare services. The resources might be better spent on other 
treatments for other patients with other conditions, as more health is generated thereby. 
 
However, there are at least three important reasons to resist this conclusion. First, TIV is 
offered for many conditions other than ALS. It is unreasonable to consider a proposal to 
defund TIV only for one of these conditions, if treatment is comparably costly for the others. 
Second, the state might finance treatment that is even much less cost-effective than TIV for 
ALS. Third, in most countries there is no explicit threshold for acceptable cost-effectiveness 
that has been adopted by the state for the entire healthcare sector. Sanctioning by the highest 
level of democratic government would be necessary to confer legitimacy on such a threshold. 
Arguably, it is not reasonable to expect the professional community itself to decide to cease 
offering certain services due to resource constraints and poor cost-effectiveness. Any decision 
to limit the offer of TIV for ALS patients would be a hard to make, and could also be felt to 
go against the clinician’s primary commitment to the good of his or her patients [36]. Any 
such new policy, then, should either be made at the political level where the relevant authority 
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resides, or, alternatively, follow explicitly and unambiguously from general priority setting 
principles adopted at the political level. As long as the relevant political support is lacking, 
discontinuing TIV for ALS patients merely because of low cost-effectiveness arguably is not 
justified.  
 
The need for good decision-making processes 
The ethical challenges examined here substantiate the claim that treatment with TIV is not 
necessarily in the best interests of the ALS patient or the next of kin, even when the patient 
expresses a preference for it. There are substantial risks – risks of making a choice that will 
later be regretted, of overtreatment and having to endure poor quality of life due to improper 
timing of treatment withdrawal, and of burdening next of kin. As shown, in a traditional 
medico-ethical «four principles» framework, the next of kin and their plight risks being 
neglected; yet their interests should also be safeguarded. Similarly, the interests of healthcare 
professionals and carers have little place in the framework, yet their viewpoints should also be 
taken into consideration. 
 
In our view, the presence of these risks places great demands on the quality of the decision-
making process [33]. Physicians must recognize the responsibility that comes with their great 
power to structure and set the agenda for the decision-making process. The patient’s right to 
remain undecided must be respected, even though this might lead to further dilemmas. In our 
experience, some patients do not want to make a choice about TIV in spite of repeated 
attempts to address the issue. In some cases, such patients are later on resuscitated from an 
acute CO2 narcosis. They may then have to choose between TIV and death – the same 
question that they previously did not want to answer or in some cases even discuss. Patients 
should be confronted with such a scenario, including the possibility that HCPs might refrain 
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The main message of this article has been that the special nature of ALS and of TIV lead to a 
set of challenges that are more or less specific to these treatment choices, and that are difficult 
in two senses: First, they might be difficult to handle well; second, and more interestingly, 
they might be difficult to discuss, however well aware clinicians are of them. Problems such 
as future prospects for treatment withdrawal and the balancing of the interests of patient and 
next of kin respectively, might be difficult to discuss openly in the physician-patient setting. 
Problems such as the low cost-effectiveness of the treatment, and the plight of next of kin can 
be difficult to communicate to the public. Finally, problems such as the demanding work 
situation for professional carers in the patient’s home and the burdens on next of kin are – 
because they do not touch on the patient’s interests directly – difficult to give weight in 
decisions and guideline documents. In order to improve decision-making, health professionals 
should discuss more of these challenges openly, with the requisite sensitivity. Criteria for 
decision-making can be of some help, yet a great deal of discretion is required for the 
clinicians engaged in the decision of whether treatment should be offered. 
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